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RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Robert E. Rodes, Jr.*

The four years since this subject was last surveyed have been eventful
ones; we cannot hope to do more than hit the high spots. A considerable
liberalization of the coverage of the compensation laws is to be discerned in this period, highly influenced, it may be suspected, by the
recent and much-cited Larson treatise.1 The liberal pattern Dean Larson
imposes on his material has evidently commended itself to the courts.
I.

WORK-CONNECTED

MALADIES-HEART

CASES,

OCCUPATIONAL

DISEASES, AND THE LIKE

At this point, we seem well on the way to a solution of the troublesome question of the heart cases. A majority of the Supreme Court still
adheres to the "unusual strain" doctrine in heart cases, but the majority
is only four to three, and any change in the personnel of the court may
well result in the abandonment of the doctrine. 2 By admitting that the
rule does not apply to other employment-connected deteriorations, 3 the
courts would seem to be abandoning any pretence of a rational foundation for it.
The original rationale of the rule, it will be recalled, is that the statutory requirement that there be an "accident" is not satisfied unless some
event takes place beyond the mere employment. 4 There is, perhaps,
medical opinion that would have it that a heart attack cannot be causally attributed to the employment at all unless something happens beyond what the victim is used to. This, however, is a controversial medical
question, and there would seem to be expert opinion available to attribute heart attacks causally to the employment even in the absence

of any unusual strain. 5 Thus, the unusual strain requirement must be
regarded as a legal requirement over and above causality-which is
* Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University.
1. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1952).
2. Mergel v. N.J. Conveyors Corp., 14 N.J. 609, 1o3

A.2d 594 (1954).
3. Bialko v. H. Baker Milk Co., 38 N.J. Super. 169, 118 A.2d 412 (App. Div. 1955)

(cerebral hemorrhage).
4. Cf. Neylon v. Ford Motor Company, 8 N.J. 586, 86 A.2d 577
325, 91 A.2d

569

(1952).

(1952);

1o

N.J.

5. The resolution of this conflict in expert opinion presents some difficulty in
achieving a uniform treatment for heart cases. The Bialko case supra, accomplished
a resolution by holding that greater weight should be given to the testimony of the
doctor who treated the patient. This doctrine is a great boon to the workingman,
but if it is premised on the theory that treatment of a case will give a better insight
into a controverted question of theory, it seems difficult to accept.
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what the Supreme Court opinions indicate that it is. 6 This being so, it

seems fairly clear that we cannot have a coherent system of jurisprudence as long as we require an unusual strain in heart cases, but not in
cerebral hemorrhage cases. The days of the unusual strain doctrine are
obviously numbered.
Meanwhile, important qualifications have been introduced. First, the
Mergel case 7 indicates that a strain may be unusual so as to satisfy the
doctrine even if it is prolonged over several days, and that an occupation may be so variegated that there can be no criterion of usualness
advanced to defeat compensability. Second, the Snoden 8 case indicates
that the application of the unusual strain doctrine is factual in nature,
so that the findings of the lower courts can be left undisturbed by the
Supreme Court. This process of getting rid of troublesome legal questions by pretending they are factual is a familiar one under the federal
compensation legislation,9 but in New Jersey it is new. Doctrinally,
there is little to be said for it. A piece of terminology that lacks sufficient referent in reality to be applied by a judge will scarcely have
sufficient referent to be applied by a trier of fact.' 0 It seems likely,
however, that the lower tribunals will be so unsympathetic to the unusual strain doctrine as to make short work of it under the invitation
given them in Snoden. This is probably the next best thing to an outand-out abandonment of the rule by the Supreme Court.
All this learning on heart cases, however, should have been made
obsolete by the 1949 amendment to N.J. REV. STAT. 34:15-31, defining a
compensable occupational disease to include:
* * . all diseases arising out of and in the course of employment, which
are due to causes and conditions which are or were characteristic of or
peculiar to a particular .

.

. employment, or which diseases are due to

the exposure of any employee to a cause thereof arising out of and in
the course of his employment.
This is the clearest possible abandonment of the old rule that a disease
to be occupational had to inhere qua disease in the employment.' Thus,
recent cases have quite correctly held that a disease caught from a fellow-employee, and an aggravation of a pre-existing condition by an
otherwise harmless industrial process are both compensable occupa6. The majority opinion in the Mergel case supra, requires "an event or happening beyond the mere employment itself which brings about the final result or con-

tributes thereto and without which the injury or death would not have resulted."
14 N.J. at 613, 103 A.2d at 596 (1954) (italics supplied).
7. Note 2 supra.

8. Snoden v. Borough of Watchung, 15 N.J. 376, 104 A.2d 841 (1954).

9. See O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 ('95'); Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
io. See this writer's Workmen's Compensation for Maritime Employees: Obscurity in the Twilight Zone, 68 HARV. L. REv. 637 (1955).
ii. For a fairly recent example from another jurisdiction, see Matter of Harman
v. Republic Aviation Corp., 298 N.Y. 285, 82 N.E.2d 785 (1948).
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tional diseases under the quoted legislation. 12 Under the old conception
of an occupational disease as one which inhered in the occupation,
there could be gaps between compensable accident and compensable occupational disease, whereby some injuries causally related to
the employment went uncompensated.13 But a proper interpretation of
the quoted provision would seem to require that accident and compensable occupational disease be held between them to exhaust the class of
employment-connected injuries.
This would seem particularly true of the heart cases. Assuming that
a given heart attack is shown by competent medical testimony to be due
to exertion on the job, the particular exertion would seem necessarily
to be either an unusual one or one characteristic of or peculiar to the
employment. The courts have been willing to find an unusual strain
whenever anything out of the ordinary occurs; it remains only to bring
the usual within the language of N.J. REv. STAT. 34:15-31-a result that
should be inescapable under the broad language of that section. Since
the compensation for an occupational disease is the same as that for an
accidental injury, 4 there would seem to be no need to decide which of
the two a particular claim is once it is established that it must be one or
the other.15 Thus, if N.J. REV. STAT. 34:15-31 is properly presented to
the court, we may hope to hear no more of the heart cases.
One other point in the disease area needs comment-the case of the
epileptic who hit his head on the cement floor of his factory when he
fell during a seizure.' It was held, four to three, that he was not entitled
to compensation because his injury was not causally related to his employment. Since there was no showing that the employment contributed
to the seizure itself, the real question of causality was as to the account
to be taken of the concrete floor. If it were to be regarded as a hazard of
the employment, there seems to be no doubt that compensation would
be awarded-as it was when an employee fell against a hot stove on
account of his epileptic seizure. 7 But here the majority held that there
is no difference between this floor and one he might encounter any12. Reynolds v. General Motors Corp., 38 N.J. Super. 274, 1i8 A.2d 724 (Hudson
Co. Ct., Law Div. 1955) aff'd on other grounds 4o N.J. Super. 484, 123 A.2d 555
(App. Div. 1956) (tuberculosis caught from fellow employee); Giambattista v.
Thomas A. Edison, 32 N.J. Super. 103, 107 A.2d Soi (App. Div. 1954) (fungoid condition of hand aggravated by immersion in benzine).
13. What is necessary for such an eventuality is that the onset of the disease be
gradual, thus running afoul of the requirement that an accident be a sudden event,
and that the disease not be one which inheres in the employment.

14.

N.J.

REv. STAT. 34:15-32.

15. There appears to be no practice of bringing claims for accident or occupational disease in the alternative, but there does not appear to be anything to prevent doing so.
16. Henderson v. Celanese Corp., 16 N.J.

208,

so8 A.2d 267 (1954).

17. Reynolds v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs., 13o N.J.L. 437, 33 A.2d 595
(Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd 131 N.J.L. 327, 36 A.2d 429 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944).
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where he chanced to fall: "Rigidity and firmness are adjuncts of the
average floor despite its particular composition." 18
Judge Clapp's dissent in the Appellate Division, adopted by the dissenters in the Supreme Court, points out that the requirement that the
injury arise out of a hazard peculiar to the employment or increased by
it has no warrant in the statutory language, and has hitherto been applied in New Jersey only where an extraordinary force of nature, such
as lightning, caused the injury. But Judge Clapp seems to reject not
merely the requirement that there be a hazard peculiar to the employment, but also any requirement that there be a condition peculiar to
the employment. He would compensate wherever he finds causally
related to the injury any physical attribute of the employment, even
if the same physical attribute could have been found anywhere else, and
would have had the same effect wherever it was found.
There appear, then, to be involved here not two but three formulations of the meaning of the word "employment" in the phrase "arising
out of the employment." Judge Clapp will be satisfied if the physical
and human surroundings to which the employee is subjected on the
job contributed to the injury, while the majority require further that
the surroundings be those to which the employee is subjected because
he is on the job rather than elsewhere. Thus, in the Gargiulo20 case an
employee who was hit by a boy's arrow while at work in the back yard
of his employer's store was awarded compensation because but for the
employment he would not have been there, and, therefore, would not
have been hit. The injury was contributed to not only by his physical
surroundings, as in the instant case, but by his physical surroundings
as distinguished from other physical surroundings. The very terminology of a "but for" test for causation would seem to require that this distinction be taken into account. To be distinguished is the view, evidently advocated by the employer in Gargiulo, that there must be a
hazard peculiar to the employment that contributes to the injury. This
view Judge Clapp shows to be rejected by the New Jersey cases. In view
of Gargiulo,it does not seem proper to read the instant case as adopting
it. The law now seems to be that there must be a condition peculiar to
the employment, but not necessarily one creating a special hazard.
There remains to be considered Judge Clapp's argument that the
injury was contributed to by a condition peculiar to the employmentthe fact that the floor was concrete instead of some softer material. This
seems plausible, if not notably more plausible than the majority view
that floors generally are so hard that relative hardness among them is
insignificant. At any rate, there is no great legal issue involved on this
level, and it is well settled that not everyone can have compensation. If
i8. i6 N.J. at 214, io8 A.-2d at 270.
19. 3o N.J. Super. 953, 36o, 104 A.2d

720 (App. Div. 1954).
2o. Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 13 N.J. 8, 97 A.2d 593 (1953).
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we turn to policy considerations, it is at least possible that a decision
for compensation here would have an adverse effect on the employability of epileptics that would leave them as a class worse off than they
are under the prevailing decision.
II.

CUT Ups, FIGHTS AND FROLICS

Most significant of the course-of-employment cases seems to be the
Secor 21 case. Secor, a garage attendant, had been splashed with gasoline

while filling a customer's tank. His employer told him-how firmly is
in doubt from the testimony-to change his clothes. He stated that he
was not afraid of gasoline, and lit a match-whether to light a cigarette
or to demonstrate his lack of fear is again in doubt. Next thing, he was
in flames. The majority held that even assuming the least favorable of
the possibilities open on the testimony, Secor could not be said to have

deviated from the course of his employment sufficiently to warrant
denial of compensation. It having been admitted on all sides that the
injury was not intentionally self-inflicted, the decision would seem to
be unassailable, if unconventional. The dissenters in the Supreme Court
did not file an opinion, but Judge Jayne's delightful one-page dissent

22
in the Appellate Division more than supplies the defect. "As well",
it concludes, "might he have chosen to bite the nozzle of the hose to

display the strength of his teeth."

Here is rationality responding to the wholly irrational. Can it be in
the course of a man's employment to do what it would have been supposed that no one in his right mind would ever do? For the majority in
both cases, the deviation is momentary, impulsive, and thus within the
range of attention to the job at hand that is to be expected of a human,
as distinguished from a mechanical, agent. Dean Larson, in a passage
quoted and relied on by the Supreme Court, puts it this way:
Along with all the other frailties of the average man-his carelessness,
his prankishness, his tobacco habit, his cola habit, his inclination to rest
once in a while and chat with his neighbor-there must also be expected
one more: his natural human proclivity for sticking his head in mysterious openings, putting his fingers in front of fan blades, 2and pulling
wires and pins on strange mechanical objects that he finds. 3
It should be noted that the Supreme Court seems to be combining
momentariness and naturalness into one thing, whereas there would
seem no reason to suppose a deviation could not be prolonged but natural, or, indeed, momentary but unnatural. The former of these possible
cases was disposed of adversely to the employee in Robertson v. Express
Container Corp.24 To Judge Jayne, the latter of them is the instant case,
and is also to be disposed of adversely to the employee. But it seems that
21. Secor v. Penn Service Garage, 19 N.J. 315, 117 A.2d 12 (1955).
22. 35 N.J. Super. 59, 66, 113 A.2d 177, 181 (App. Div. 1955).
23. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 369 (1952).
24. 13 N.J. 342, 99 A.2d 649 (1953).
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the Supreme Court is advisedly combining the two factors into one.
The question ought to be, in every case, whether the action asserted to
be a deviation is that of a human being applying himself in a human
way to his job. To this question both the time he spends and what he
does with it are relevant, but neither is dispositive.
Given this criterion, does Secor come within it? His act was certainly
momentary; was it natural in the way that curiosity is natural? Anyone
who has kicked an automobile because it refused to start cannot deny
that it is.25 Secor was ill-advised in his attempt to assert his superiority
over his inanimate environment, but the motivation is not unfamiliar.
a
There seems to be no reason for denying Secor what we give to
26
woman who puts her head in the way of a descending dumb-waiter.
2 7 involved a gas station
Another deviation case, Green v. DeFuria,
attendant who left his station to silence a horn that had started blowing
in the middle of the night in an automobile parked in another station
across the street. The trip was perhaps in violation of an order by the
employer never to leave the station alone. Compensation was allowed
by the Supreme Court for injuries sustained when he fell into a grease
pit in the other station. The court advanced various considerations, and
seemed to rely more on the cumulative effect of them all than on any
one of them. It was pointed out that the employee might have regarded
the deviation as in furtherance of his master's business, either because it
enabled him to hear the telephone or because it increased the good will
of his neighbors, and that even if the rule was violated by going so short
a way away (leaving a friend watching the office), the violation might
have been reasonable under the circumstances. The general idea of this
case, then, is that a departure from the usual activities of the employment will not break the course of the employment if it was reasonable
under all the circumstances, and that the existence of a rule will be only
one of the circumstances to be taken into account, The court did not
consider what the effect would have been had the employee gone to
silence the horn because he could not stand listening to it, but it is
likely that no different result would have been reached. Together, the
two cases just discussed seem to be moving away from a rigid criterion
for deviation, and toward a flexible standard that takes account both of
the exigencies of the situation and of the foibles of human nature.
Among these foibles, belligerency has come in for a good deal of
consideration during the period under survey.28 Of the three cases involving assault victims, one, where the victim attempted to make the
25. Note also that we have made a folk-hero out of John Henry, who, according
to the legend, died in a fruitless attempt to drive steel faster than a steam drill. It
appears that no compensation law was in force at the time.
26. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Parker, 64 F.Supp. 615 (D. Md. 1946), cited with approval in the instant case.
27. 19 N.J. 290, i 16 A.2d 19 (1955).

28. Some attention seems also to have been paid to pub-hopping. White v. Sindlinger, 3o N.J. Super. 525, 1o5 A.2d 437 (App. Div. 1954).
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assaulter stop heckling a third employee whose distraction was slowing
the victim's work, is fairly obvious for compensation, and only one

29
justice was for denying it.

The two other assault cases are delayed-action cases. In Augelli v.
Rolans Credit Clothing Store,30 Augelli, at work collecting bills, came
upon one Belcher with whom, while on a similar errand some weeks
previously, he had had words concerning the driving of their respective
automobiles. Belcher was disposed to renew the quarrel, and Augelli
sought compensation for the resulting injuries. The Appellate Division
wrestled with the problem of distinguishing between a work-connected
quarrel and a "personal feud." It pointed out that the delay between
the work-connected quarrel and the assault is relevant only if assaulter
and victim have meanwhile had some association extraneous to the
employment which might have led to the assault. Augelli was fortunate
that he had not seen Belcher before or since the original quarrel except
when the assault took place.
He was fortunate also that he was again at work when assaulted. Had
he not been, the accident would have been "arising out of" the employment, but would not have been "in the course of" it. This was a bitter
lesson for one Lester who visited his place of employment in an off time,
and there renewed a work-connected quarrel, thus getting himself
beaten up. He was unable to persuade the trier of fact that he had an
employment-connected reason for being there at the time, and only
three justices of the Supreme Court thought the attempt of a supervisory employee to settle the quarrel brought him back in the course of
31
his employment.
The rule requiring that the victim be at work when assaulted is a
harsh one, and has no reason behind it except an unimaginative reading
of the statute. But it seems to be so solidly ensconced in the cases that
not even Larson is willing to depart from it.32 To this writer, however,
it seems arguable either that the course of the employment extends
wherever the consequences of the employment extend, or that the
course-of-employment requirement is satisfied whenever the injury is
the culmination of a chain of events initiated by the employment. A
man who falls into the river in the course of his employment abandons
his master's business and devotes himself to his personal business of
swimming; should he drown after a long period of such a deviation, no
one doubts that compensation would be allowed. One who antagonizes
a sufficiently vengeful adversary may well be in as great danger as one
who has fallen into the water.
For a different analogy, if a radio repairman is awakened in the mid29.

Cierpal v. Ford Motor Co., 16 N.J. 561, 1o9 A.2d 666 (1954).

3o. 33 N.J. Super. 146,

1o9 A.2d 439 (App. Div. 1954).
31. Lester v. Elliott Bros. Trucking Co., 18 N.J. 434, 114 A.2d 8 (1955).
32. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW

445

(1952).
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dle of the night and asked to repair a radio, and electrocutes himself, he
is in the course of his employment because repairing radios is an incident of his job. If a man comes to his door to discuss a radio already repaired, and he trips going downstairs to let him in, probably the same
result-talking about work done is an incident of doing it. But if talking about it is such an incident, why is not being beaten up over it? Can
it be that a brief self-justificatory harangue before or during the scuffle
will make all the difference? The only difference discernible between a
discussion of the job and a beating over the job is that one is active on
the part of the employee, the other passive. This distinction has no warrant at all in the statute.

III. THE COVERED EMPLOYMENT RELATION
During the period under survey, it was held that a parishoner working on a church building is not an employee of the church, 33 that a man
sent by his union as a one-day replacement for another union member
is not a casual employee,3 4 that a limited partnership is an entity so
distinct from its members that it may in appropriate circumstances be
the employer of one of them,3 5 and that where four men who make
explosives as a spare-time business are so thoughtful as to incorporate,
and to agree that the two among them who do the work will get paid
when the business pays off, the widows of the latter two will be entitled
to compensation when they blow themselves up.36
More interesting in the last of the cases just referred to-the Nitroform cases-is the determination that the wages of the decedents are
to be computed on the basis of what they earn at their regular full-time
jobs, rather than what they expect to get from their spare-time work for
the employer in whose service they are killed. This holding has in its
favor the policy consideration stated by Dean Larson in a passage used
by the Supreme Court to head off its discussion of this topic: 31 "compensation is for the economic loss to the worker, and the computation
based on wages is merely a basis for computing that loss." Since the
loss is of his whole productivity, the court argues from this premise,
compensation for his whole productivity is in order. The decision
seems on the whole sound, although it may have ramifications worth
further consideration, such as if a person's two jobs should be at entirely
different ranges of remuneration, or if a person should be working two
full-time jobs at a pace no one could possibly keep up for more than a
33. Armitage v. Trustees of Mt. Fern M.E. Church, 33 N.J. Super. 367, iio A.2d
154 (Morris Co. Ct., Law Div. 1954).
34. Malloy v. Capitol Bakery, 38 N.J. Super. 516, 119 A.2d 487 (Middlesex Co. Ct.,

Law Div. 1955).
35. Carle v. Carle Tool & Engineering Co., 36 N.J. Super. 36,
Div. 1955).

114

A.2d 738 (App.

36. Mahoney v. Nitroform Co., Inc., 2o N.J. 499, 12o A.2d 454 (1956).

37.

2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPE"NSATION LAW 71 (1952).
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short period. It should be noted also that the holding introduces a
certain discrepancy into insurance rates based on the payrolls of the
particular employer, since the quantum of compensation will be influenced by factors extraneous to that payroll. No doubt, however, the
incidence of double employment is so slight that it will find its way
into the rates without a serious problem.
One case, allowing compensation to a man who ran his own earthmoving service with his own heavy equipment, 8 seems to this writer
objectionable in that it used as a test the amount of control exercised
over the workman, to the exclusion of the "economic dependency"
test which generally gives sounder results. The idea that a man is my
employee if I exercise control over him is a product of the law of
vicarious liability, where it makes perfect sense. But the term employee
should not be used univocally in the vicarious liability context and in
the social legislation context. The one considers a business with respect
to the impact of its activities on outsiders, the other with respect to the
distribution of its economic proceeds. There is no necessary connection
between the two. Thus, the courts have very wisely refused to be bound
by the precedents created under the law of vicarious liability when the
employment status under a piece of social legislation was in issue.
Instead, the "economic dependency" test was developed, whereby a
workman is an employee for these purposes if his status in the operation
is such that he is dependent on his employer for his support. Thus, in
the well-known Silk case, men who brought their .own shovels to shovel
coal into bags were held to be employees, although under almost no
control, whereas men who brought their own trucks to drive off the
coal thus loaded were not.39 Thus, for social legislation, including

workmen's compensation, ownership of equipment representing a substantial investment, as there was in the instant case, should be a far
more significant factor than control. This is not to deny that the
exigencies of a given business may be such as to make the owner of substantial equipment economically dependent on the contractor for whom
he uses it. But, the court is silent on the point. If, as would seem from
the instant case, our Supreme Court is going to regard control as of
more significance than economic dependency in determining who is an
employee, the general effect will be to deny compensation where it
should be given.
The subject of the covered employment relation gave rise to an
extremely peculiar constitutional case during the period under survey.
In DeMonaco v. Renton,40 it was held that the constitutional requirement of equal protection was offended by excluding from the coverage
of the act a class consisting of all persons "[e]ngaged in the vending,
38. Piantanida v. Bennett, 17 N.J. 291 , 111 A.2d 412 (1955).
39. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
40. 18 N.J. 352, 113 A.2d 782 (1955).
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selling or offering for sale or delivering directly to the general public
newspapers, magazines or periodicals or acting as sales agent or distributor as an independent contractor of or for any such newspaper, magazine or periodical ..." As legislation, the provision has little or nothing
to be said for it. It denies compensation to a group of working people
in one of the lowest economic brackets, obviously economically dependent and incapable of providing for their exigencies out of their own
means. As to workers in this class who are of age, denying compensation
seems inexcusable. Where minors are involved, it is perhaps arguable
that the primary responsibility for their injuries should fall on the
parents rather than on the employer. But the parents themselves are in
all likelihood unable to provide properly for serious injuries to their
children. One who employs the child would seem to have a moral
responsibility, if not to the child himself, to the family unit of which
the child is a part. Thus, exclusionary legislation like that quoted
would seem to be open to serious moral objection.
But can that moral objection be translated into a constitutional
objection? If there is a legitimate way of doing so, the court has not used
it. The opinion in the instant case begins by construing the statutory
language as broadly as possible-indeed, more broadly than this writer
would have thought possible-to apply to every person whose duties
include, as however insignificant a part, the selling or delivery of
newspapers, magazines or periodicals. Thus, we are told, under this
statute we can have two clerks behind the counter at a soda fountain.
The grill is at the right-hand and, while the cash register is on the left
.with a pile of Star-Ledgers beside it. The right-hand man who makes
sandwiches and the left-hand man who takes care of the cash register
both slip in a pool of chocolate syrup while making ice cream cones in
the middle. The right-hand man is compensated and the left-hand man
is not on account of those Star-Ledgers. Having thus elongated the neck
of the statute, the court proceeds to chop. There can be no legitimate
reason for a statute that thus irrationally distinguishes between soda
clerks. The result is obvious.
However much one may sympathize with the desire to get rid of so
obnoxious a statute, so flagrant a violation of the principle that a statute
is to be so construed as to save it can scarcely be condoned. What the
statute is meant to apply to, is those in the business of news-vending,
as distinguished from those in the business of soda-clerking or the like.
The distribution of periodicals is an established industry having, no
doubt, like any other, twilight zones around the edges, but constituting
on the whole a fairly distinguishable class. This class-whether from
sinister motives or from a desire to see cheap, plentiful literature in the
hands of their constituents we cannot tell-the legislature desired to
favor specially with a special financial advantage. However reprehensible it may be thus to subsidize industry at the expense of the working-

150
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man, it cannot be said to be an irrational system of classification. It
should be noted that a good many of the moral objections to this exemption would seem to apply with equal force to that of farm labor,
a class that is excluded from workmen's compensation benefits in almost
every state except New Jersey.
IV.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

The important Neylon litigation terminated during the period under
survey with an award of counsel fees under R. R.

5

:2- 5 (f) of $2,850,

slightly less than ten times the amount of the award. The employer
contended that counsel should be given no more than the claimant
might reasonably be expected to pay for services resulting in the
$296.43 actually recovered. Judge Jayne in the Appellate Division gave
the contention the treatment for which he is famous. 41 The result of this
holding will be that when a test case turns out to be small in amount it
will still be possible to have competent counsel on both sides.
The other case during the survey period on attorney's fees in the compensation case proper, involved the interpretation of the 1952 amendment respecting the effect of a settlement offer on the amount of the
fee. Before that amendment, the statute provided that when, prior to
the hearing, compensation is offered, the fee must be based on only the
difference between the amount offered and that awarded. The amendment inserted the words "at a reasonable time" before "prior." 42 In
Seitz v. The Singer Mfg. Co. 43 it was held that an offer made two working days before the hearing, particularly when it was not communicated
to counsel, did not come within the purview of the statute as amended.
The reasonableness of the time was held to be dependent on the probability that counsel would not have to go through the work of preparing
for the hearing.
But the most important attorney's fee cases during the survey period
were those involving third-party claims. The 1951 amendment to N.J.
REV. STAT. 34:15-40, whereby the employer or insurance carrier is responsible for a share of the attorney's fee on a third-party recovery by
the employee, 44 has been thoroughly treated in five cases in various
courts. In two cases, the Supreme Court held that the liability of the
employer for his share of attorney's fees extends to no more than the
same percentage of the compensation liability that the attorney is to
receive of the total recovery, 45 that the percentage is of estimated future
41. Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 27 N.J. Super. 511, 99 A.2d 664 (App. Div. 1953).

No one thought to raise the question of the constitutionality of R. R.

5 :2- 5 (f),

but

there would seem to be at least some question whether making a litigant pay his
adversary's counsel fees is merely procedural.
42. N.J. REV. STAT. 34:15-64, as amended N.J. Laws 1952, c. 18, p. 1040.
43. 36 N.J. Super. 546, 116 A.2d 641 (App. Div. 1955).
44. N.J. Laws 1951, c. 169.
45. Caputo v. The Best Foods, 17 N.J. 259, 111 A.2d 261 (1955).
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compensation liability as well as of compensation already paid, 46 and
that the sum is a reimbursement to the employee for attorney's fees incurred or paid by him, so that the attorney cannot have a percentage
and the same percentage of
of the total recovery from the employee
4 7
the employer's share in addition.

In another case, the Appellate Division held that on a proper showing (not made in the particular case) the injured employee could be
48
held to have waived his right to reimbursement of his attorney's fees.
This holding seems objectionable in that the only occasion that will
present the employee with a bona fide reason for waiving attorney's fees
will be one in which, as in the particular case, the employer or insurance carrier is involved in the third party's liability, as an indemnitor
or as a liability insurer. For everyone except the attorney, the waiver
of the attorney's fee is tantamount to a reduction of the amount to be
paid into the settlement by the employer or insurance carrier, together
with a corresponding reduction in the amount accepted by the employee in settlement. Let us consider how this will work. Assume a certain employee has sustained injuries resulting in a compensation liability of $21,ooo. He sues a third party, who, either by contract or under

some common-law rule, is entitled to indemnity from the employer.
Negotiations have proceeded to such a point that the employer-indemnitor is willing to expend another $16,ooo to settle the case. The employee's attorney has two alternative methods of settling. Assuming that
he has been retained on a one-third contingent fee, and he advises the
employee not to waive reimbursement, a settlement of $30,000 will

result in the desired $i 6,ooo out-of-pocket for the employer. The thirdparty tortfeasor will pay $30,000, for all of which the employer will in-

demnify him. The employer, meanwhile, will get back the $21,ooo
compensation liability (or an equivalent remission of future liability 49),
less $7,ooo attorney's fee, or $14,000. $30,000 out less $14,000 in makes

a total of $i 6,ooo out. Under the other alternative, with waiver of attorney's fees by the employee, the settlement figure can be fixed at $37,000
-that

figure less this time the full $2 1,ooo reimbursement again mak-

ing the desired $16,ooo.
But let us see who gets the $ i 6,ooo under the two alternatives. Under
the first alternative, the settlement figure is $3o,ooo, entitling the attorney to a fee of $io,ooo. $7,000 of this is paid by the employer, as we
have seen, leaving $3,ooo to be made up by the employee out of his
$9,000 ($30,000 less $21,000 compensation reimbursement) net. Final
46. Ibid.
47. Dante v. Gotelli, 17 N.J. 254, 111 A.2d 267 (1955).

48. McDermott v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 40 N.J. Super. 119, 122 A.2d 371
(App. Div. 1956).
49. The mechanics will be somewhat more complex than they are here shown to
be if the payments have not yet been made. It would seem, however, that the sums
ultimately pocketed by the respective parties will turn out to be the same.
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return to the employee is therefore $6,ooo. Under the second alternative, the settlement figure is $37,ooo, entitling the attorney to a fee of
$12,333.33, all of which must be made up by the employee, who has
waived his right to have the employer pay part. Thus, out of the
$37,ooo, he must pay $21,ooo in compensation reimbursement plus
$12,333.33 attorney's fee or $33,333.33 all told. This leaves him

$3,666.67 for his very own.
To summarize our calculations, in each case the employee pays out
$16,ooo in addition to the compensation liability already paid or incurred. This is distributed between the employee and his attorney as
follows:
Employee
Attorney

Alternative 1
(no waiver)
$6,000.00
10,000.00
$16,000.00

Alternative 2
(waiver)
$3,666.67
12,333.33
$16,000.00

However highly we regard the integrity of the bar, a rule of law that
puts this kind of temptation in the way of an attorney negotiating a
settlement would seem inadvisable. On the contrary, the public policy
enunciated some time ago against compromise settlements of compensation liability would seem equally strong here. 50
Another case that seems to lead to results open to somewhat similar
objections is one in the Chancery Division in which the attorney for an
injured workman, having negotiated with a third-party tortfeasor a
settlement for an amount less than the compensation liability, was
allowed to proceed in his own name for a judgment compelling the tortfeasor to pay the agreed-on settlement into court, and the compensation
carrier to release its subrogation rights in exchange for the money thus
paid in less the attorney's fee. 51 The court, although it questioned the
desirability of denying the employer or carrier any control over a settlement for less than the compensation liability, felt compelled under the
law to grant the relief sought. The upshot of the case is that an attorney
is left free to negotiate in a case in which his client has no stake. The
employee has no financial interest in the settlement to be effectuated,
and the wishes of the financially interested employer or carrier are not
to be consulted. The attorney, then, seems to be in a position of representing no one but himself. The workmen's compensation law may contain nothing against such a result, but a sound regulation of the practice
of law would seem to require something different. Perhaps it would not
be going too far to say that the attorney is under a secondary responsibility to the subrogee, subordinate, of course, to his duties to his own
client, but superior to his right to his own private cut of the take. At
5 o . P. Bronstein & Co., Inc. v. Hoffman, 117 N.J.L. 500, 189 Atl. 121 (936).
51. Belfatto v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co., 39 N.J. Super. 507, 121 A.2d
431 (Ch. Div. 1956).
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any rate, he should not be given standing to enforce the settlement in
his own name without any showing of authority from his client.
The last case in this series, although earlier in time, is one in the
Law Division holding that where the compensation proceeding was
brought in New York and the third-party action in New Jersey, the
New York law, under which the attorney's fee all comes out of the employee's share, was controlling, so that the insurance carrier was entitled
to reimbursement of the full amount of the compensation award, without deduction. 2 This seems to be perfectly sound conflicts doctrine,
but, in the light of the cases just discussed, it may indicate not only the
possibility of the third-party claim affecting the advantage for the
employee of choosing New Jersey instead of some other state as a compensation forum-as will be discussed below-but also the possibility
of a conflict of interest between the employee and the attorney advising
him as to the proper compensation forum to choose.
The attorney's lien cases, then, seem to have reached an effective adjustment between the employee and the employer or carrier. There
remains for further judicial consideration only the attorney himself,
whom the ramifications of the law have thrust into an unfortunate
position of playing a lone hand in the midst of the negotiations involved
in the third-party settlement. It would seem to be vital to the preservation of the traditional conception of the attorney as representing a
client that some change be made either in, the case law or in the rules
respecting the practice of law.
V.

CONFLICT OF LAWS

The survey period produced two Supreme Court cases and two lower
court cases meriting discussion. One of the latter is the one just mentioned that applies the law of the state in which the award is entered
to the question of whether attorney's fees in a third-party recovery are
payable out of the reimbursement to the employer or insurance carrier,
or whether the latter is entitled to reimbursement in full. The upshot
is that the New Jersey compensation forum, with a benefit level usually
somewhat less advantageous than those under the New York law or
under the Longshoremen's Act, may turn out to be a more favored
forum for injured workmen with a possibility of a third-party recovery.
This may turn out to be especially true in the maritime area, where
there is often both a choice between the state and federal forums and
a valuable third-party claim. The Longshoremen's Act gives the employer complete control over the third-party claim, unless the employee
is willing to forego compensation until the claim is prosecuted to com52.

1954).

Privetera v. Hillcrest Homes, Inc., 29 N.J. Super. 591, 103 A.2d 55 (Law Div.

154

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

pletion. 53 Where the third-party claim is apt to be substantial, the most
important use of compensation is to enable the injured workman to
maintain himself while waiting for the third-party claim to be tried or
settled. Maritime employers seem to have been in the habit of voluntarily paying compensation for this purpose, although they are not
obliged under the law to do so. But, as Justice Black pointed out in dissent, their enthusiasm for this procedure is apt to be dampened by the
case in the United States Supreme Court recognizing a rather broad
liability on the part of the employer to indemnify the third-party tort54
feasor.
The New Jersey law will fill in the breach in a good many cases.
Under it, the worker will not only be able to have compensation while
prosecuting his third-party claim, he will, under any given third-party
settlement, be richer by one third of the New Jersey compensation than
he would have been if he had sought his remedy under the Longshoremen's Act. 55

This being the case, the question of the extent to which the New
Jersey act is an alternative to the Longshoremen's Act becomes of considerable importance. The Supreme Court expressed itself on this point
in Green v. Simpson & Brown Construction Co.,5 6 an unfortunate
opinion which makes no attempt to set forth a state policy with respect
to jurisdiction for injuries on navigable waters, and badly misapprehends the federal authorities. While the opinion is quite right in saying that the United States Supreme Court adheres verbally to the proposition that a state cannot provide compensation to workers injured on
navigable waters in maritime employment, the statement that "a state
has no power to enact statutes granting compensation for injuries sustained on navigable waters" 51 is in direct conflict with a number of
federal authorities, and supported by none. And even the verbalization
about injuries on navigable waters in a maritime employment is no
longer being applied in practice to limit the availability of state compensation. The process by which this was accomplished is too complicated to be set forth here,58 but the present situation is that all assumptions of jurisdiction by either state or federal authorities have been met
by per curiam affirmances in the United States Supreme Court.59 On
53. Czaplicki v. The S.S. Hoegh Silvercloud, 76 S. Ct. 946 (1956) has qualified
this control where the employer or carrier is not timely in prosecuting the employee's
case, and has adverse interest.
54. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 348 U.S. 813 (1955).
55. Since the compensation collected will in any case have to be given back, the
difference in the benefit level will not matter.
56. 14 N.J. 66, 10 A.2d 10 (1953).
57. Id. at 71, l1 A.2d at 12.

58. See this writer's Workmen's Compensation for Maritime Employees: Obscurity in the Twilight Zone, 68 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1955).
59. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948); Avondale Marine Ways,
Inc. v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366 (1953).
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this state of the federal law, the state can either assume all jurisdiction
the federal precedents allow it, or limit jurisdiction under rules of its
own, based either on the verbalization still given lip service in the
federal Supreme Court, or on its own statute. But our Supreme
Court in Green did none of these things. Had this aspect of the case
gone to the federal Supreme Court, the holding would certainly have
been vacated as resting on an erroneous interpretation of federal law.60
Thus, the Green case cannot be regarded as authority on the availability of state compensation to maritime workers in New Jersey. Leaving that case out of consideration, we find nothing to guide us but the
general federal practice, which has been to allow all assumptions of
state jurisdiction. This practice has never been extended to longshoremen proper (although such an extension in the future cannot be said
to be inconceivable), nor has federal jurisdiction ever been extended to
injuries on land except in the case of a marine railway or dry dock. But
between these two limits it seems that the worker will be able to choose
between federal and state compensation in every case. The difference
between the two laws with respect to attorney's fees in third-party
actions should have a certain amount of effect in influencing the choice
in favor of New Jersey.
In the area of interstate conflicts, our Supreme Court has delivered
an opinion that should be a real contribution to the clarification of the
complex problems of the effect of proceedings in one state on the right
to proceed in another. Buccheri v. Montgomery Ward & Co.61 involved
a New York resident, employed in New York, injured while on business
for his employer in New Jersey. Compensation was awarded in New
York, and subsequently was sought in New Jersey. The Supreme Court,
after reviewing the well-known federal cases held the law to be this:
i) Since the New York award did not purport to preclude an award
63
elsewhere, the Magnolia Petroleum 62 decision was not applicable.
2) The federal decisions, such as Bradford Electric,64 Alaska Packers,",
and Pacific Employers 6" indicate that what is called for is a balancing
of the interests of the two states involved; under such a balancing of
interests, the law of the state of residence, unless obnoxious to the public policy of the state of injury, should be given effect. 3) The law of
New York is not obnoxious to the public policy of New Jersey, since
benefits are comparable, the administration is equally liberal, and it is
6o. As was done in Baskin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 338 U.S. 854 (1948).
In fact, the case turned alternatively on an adequate state ground-that there was
no evidence that the injury was employment-connected.
61. 19 N.J. 594, 118 A.2d 21 (1955).

62. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
63. Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
64. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 386 U.S. 145 (1932).
65. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
66. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 3o6 U.S. 493
(1939).
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as easy for these parties to litigate in New York as in New Jersey, if not
easier.
This kind of common sense approach to conflicts problems seems
very well calculated to effectuate the policies of the workmen's compensation legislation, which are common to the various states. The
remedies afforded in New York should be at least as satisfactory as
those available here; at the same time, the instant case leaves it open
to New Jersey to supplement the remedy afforded by one of the less
liberal states. Thus, New Jersey can see that those employees in whom
she has an interest receive the measure of compensation her policy considers adequate without the necessity of reviewing awards made in states
with similar standards of adequacy.
It should be noted, however, that Buccheri has a third-party suit
pending in New Jersey. It is to be feared that the ubiquitous attorney's
fee problem is again to be discerned here. Had Buccheri prevailed in
the instant case, there would have been a New Jersey award in his favor
on the books, whereupon a pro rata share of the attorney's fee would
be payable out of the compensation returned to the employer out of
the third-party recovery. In this respect, the law of New York is emphatically not comparable to that of New Jersey. In applying the principles stated above, the court ignored the discrepancy in the treatment
of attorney's fees. This discrepancy although monetarily substantial,
would seem not to go to the policy of the respective acts. The effect of
the New York rule is to cut the amount, not of the compensation received, but of the tort recovery retained. If this were to be considered
a sufficient violation of our policy, we might apply the New Jersey rule
as to attorney's fees even though the award was entered in New York;
there seems no reason for a New Jersey award. It should be reiterated,
however, that the conflicts aspects of the attorney's fee situation, like
the legal practice aspects, present serious problems that have not yet
been attended to.
One other case of interstate conflict, this time in a county court, is of
interest. 7 It involves an airline stewardess who was hired in Missouri,
but had been operating out of Newark for some years. A number of personnel records on her were kept in Missouri. She was injured on an interstate flight, long enough after takeoff from Newark to make it inconceivable that the injury took place in New Jersey. The court denied
compensation, finding neither place of hiring nor place of injury to
support jurisdiction. Since state boundaries are themselves fairly arbitrary lines on the map, any legal distinction based on them will itself
have some savor of arbitrariness, and this may be as good a solution as
any. This writer would, however, have held that the existence of a
67. Crawford v. Trans World Airline, 27 N.J. Super. 567, 99 A.2d 673 (Hudson
Co. Ct., Law Div. 1953).
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home base in Newark localized the employment sufficiently in New
Jersey to warrant an award of compensation here.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS

The notice requirements of the Statute were considered in two cases
in the Supreme Court, both of which found sufficient notice. In one, 68 a
man presented a letter from his doctor that he was not to do any twisting, turning, or bending-which his usual work required. In the other
case, 9 a man complained to his foreman of a pain, and took the day off.
More than 90 days thereafter his disability set in. The upshot of these
cases would seem to be that anything sufficient to put the employer on
inquiry as to whether or not there was a compensable injury is sufficient
to satisfy the statutory provision that sets up actual notice as an alternative to formal written notice.
In the latter of these two cases, it was noted in passing that the
requisite notice is not of the injury but of the accident, a holding complemented by the holding in another case that it is the accident, not
the injury, that sets the statute of limitations running.70 This is hard
on an employee who does not learn of the seriousness of what has happened to him until it is too late to file a claim. It seems, however, that
the result is required by the statute.
On the subject of notices, incidentally, a County Court has held
that an insurer who was not notified of the accident by the insured can
have reimbursement for the amount of compensation paid out by it,
regardless of prejudice. 71 This seems consonant with the general principle that the rights and duties of employer and insurance carrier inter
se are not affected by the workmen's compensation law beyond what is
necessary to carry out the overriding purpose of seeing that the injured
worker knows where to look for his compensation.
The rule that medical treatment constitutes payment of compensation so as to toll the statute of limitations came in for consideration by
the Supreme Court in two cases. In the first case, the rule was qualified
by a holding that medical examination for the purpose of deciding
whether a case is compensable is not treatment.7 2 In the second, the
qualification was qualified by finding treatment where the doctor had
administered admitted treatment a year or so before, and on the occasion in question, in addition to advising the employer that the injury
was not compensable, advised the patient to consult a certain neurolo68. Goldstein v. Continental Baking Co., 16 N.J. 8, 1o5 A.2d 848 (1954).

69. Panchak v. Simmons Co., 15 N.J. 13, 1o8 A.2d 884 (1954).
70 , Schwarz v. Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 16 N.J. 243, io8 A.2d

417 (1954).
71. United National Indemnity Co. v. Sangiuliano, 38 N.J. Super. 400, 118 A.2d
35 (Law Div. 1955).
72. Schwarz v. Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 16 N.J. 243, io8 A.2d
417 (1954).
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These cases are too much dependent on their particular facts to
merit extended discussion.
Also in the medical area, the Appellate Division has held that an
employee can have medical treatment for a compensable condition after
a final award has been entered based on permanent disability arising
from the condition.7 4 This is obviously sound. Compensation as an aim
of the law should, wherever possible, be subordinated to rehabilitation,
and the principles of res judicata relied on by the employer should
have no place in defeating this important policy.
The specific awards for losses of members figured in two curious
cases. In one, it was held that a man who some time previously had
lost four fingers, and received the compensation provided for loss of a
hand, could, upon losing the rest of the hand, receive once again the
compensation provided for the loss of a hand.75 In the other, it was held
that the amputation of one phalanx of a thumb plus a "therapeuticcosmetic" cutting into the flesh of the next phalanx would be compensated as "the loss of the first phalanx and any portion of the second"
or the loss of the whole thumb.7 6 Both these holdings seem to be required by the statute; whether they are good or bad in the abstract, one
can hardly venture to say.
Two other cases worth brief note are one in which a widow of an
employee who did not apply for compensation, and died of something
else was allowed to collect permanent disability benefits accrued during
his lifetime, 77 and one holding that a director of a corporate employer
cannot be sued as a third party for negligence committed in his capacity
as director.7 8
Finally, the Appellate Division has handed down a long opinion on
the subject of the liability of an employer for common-law indemnity
to a third-party tortfeasor.79 It is well settled that such indemnity can
be had where there is a contract, but in the absence of a contract there
has been no holding in New Jersey. Judge Speakman discerns two possibilities of indemnity, one where the indemnitor-employer owes an independent duty to the third-party tortfeasor seeking indemnity, and the
other where the right to indemnity is predicated on a distinction between active and passive negligence, without an independent duty. He
73. Pfahler v. Eclipse Pioneer Div. of Bendix Aviation Corp.,

21

N.J. 486, 12

A.2d 644 (1956).

74. Van Tuyl v. Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.,

32

1o8 A.2d 483 (App. Div. 1954).

75. Heidel v. Wallace & Tiernan, 37 N.J. Super.

522,

N.J. Super. 4o6,

117 A.2d 678 (Essex Co.

Ct., Law Div. 1955).

76. Nicolai v. Fedders Quigan Corp., 39 N.J. Super. 137,

12o

A.2d 499 (Mercer

Co. Ct., Law Div. 1956).

77. Kozielec v. Mack Manufacturing Corp.,

29

N.J. Super.

272,

102

A.2d 404

(Middlesex Co. Ct., Law Div. 1953).

78. Evans v. Rohrbach, 35 N.J. Super. 26o, 113 A.2d 838 (App. Div. 1955).
79. Public Service Elec. and Gas Co. v. Waldroup, 38 N.J. Super. 419, 119 A.2d
172 (App. Div. 1955).
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addresses himself only to the second, holding that the law of New Jersey
recognizes no right of indemnity, and that even if it did it would be
barred by the workmen's compensation law, and that even if it were
not barred, the facts do not warrant it in the particular case. He distinguishes the leading case of Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester
County S. E. Corp.80 by finding that there was an independent duty
there; on this class of cases he expresses no opinion. Since, as he points
out, the facts of the case before him do not warrant indemnity on any
theory, an evaluation of Judge Speakman's distinction must await the
advent of cases that turn on it. It seems quite likely that it will turn out
to be useful.
8o.

278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).

